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Abstract
Since 2005, the European Union intensified its political commitment in Lebanon. The same year an 
Association Agreement was signed and the first Action Plan published in 2007. The Arab Uprisings 
of 2011 – and on its coat-tails the brutal war in Syria – fortified an enduring imperative of stability. 
Over the last years, the EU became more realistic in its ambitions – more assertive in its claims for 
influence, and demonstrated a greater capacity to play to its political strengths. An increasing realism 
was obscured by prevalent normative discourses reflected in EU documents. A particular normative-
geopolitical ambiguity in its external relations is caused by the imperial nature of the EU. This paper 
argues that Brussels operates in legacies of imperial rule in its efforts to stabilize and transform the 
Near East. The first chapter of the paper conceptualizes the EU’s imperial politics. The second section 
analyzes contents of the bilateral agenda, as formulated in the Action Plan, which can be compared 
with 19th century ‘standards of civilization’ developed by European states; whereas the stabilization 
policies resemble geopolitical concepts. The third chapter examines the current role of the EU in 
Lebanon, especially in light of the “three M-approach” introduced by the revised ENP of Spring 2011 
and beyond “three M” addressing security issues. Despite its successes, the Union still remains an 
underestimated actor in the Levant. This is the case mainly because the ENP suffers from its normative-
geopolitical ambiguity, demanding at the same time a geopolitically motivated stabilization of the 
peripheries (in terms of power) and a sustainable transformation of the neighbourhood converging 
with the value system of the EU (in terms of norms). 
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1. Introduction
Since the eruption of an open power conflict with 
Russia in the Eastern Neighbourhood, potential 
reform ideas of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) are on the top of the agenda. In 
its March 27 Communication the Commission 
acknowledges, that the “EU should continue 
to reflect on how the policy and its instruments 
can better respond to the very diverse contexts 
in partner countries, and how some components 
may need to be adjusted, including through the 
use of additional policy instruments.”1 This self-
critical assessment and current analyses reflect 
fundamental doubts about the arrangement of ENP 
hitherto. This paper argues that in the last years the 
Union has become more assertive in its claims for 
influence, and demonstrated a greater capacity to 
play to its political strengths.2 Below the radar, ENP 
safeguarded its main strategic interest in stability 
quite well. An increasing realism in its ambitions 
was obscured by persisting normative discourses 
reflected e.g. in the Union’s annual evaluation 
packages. This normative-geopolitical ambiguity 
of the EU’s external relations is caused by the 
imperial nature of the EU. The imperial paradigm 
was introduced into EU debates already a couple 
of years ago3, but never gained ground in standard 
international relations literature. However, the 
concept is useful in explaining some imbalances of 
present EU politics in the neighbourhood as well 
as the hesitation on side of the partner countries 
of ENP.
EU politics in Lebanon since 2011, after 
the beginning of the war in Syria, reflect the 
advantages of external relations guided by norms 
1  European Commission (2014) Neighbourhood at the Crossroads: 
Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013, 
Joint Communication JOIN(2014) 12 final, Brussels, 27.03.2014.
2  Cp. Roland Dannreuther (2007) Recasting the Barcelona 
Process: Europe and the Middle East, in: Peter Seeberg (ed.), 
EU and the Mediterranean. Foreign Policy and Security, Odense: 
University Press of Southern Denmark, 38–58, 54 f.
3  See Jan Zielonka (2006) Europe as Empire: The Nature of the 
Enlarged European Union, Oxford: Oxford UP; Alan Posener 
(2007) Imperium der Zukunft. Warum Europa Weltmacht werden 
muss, München: Pantheon; Hartmut Behr (2007) The European 
Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule? EU Accession Politics 
Viewed from a Historical Perspective, European Journal of 
International Relations, 13(2), 239-262.
and values but prioritizing short and mid-term 
stability objectives over an ambitious long-term 
reform agenda as reflected in the ENP Action 
Plan. The EU’s obsession with convergence 
hinders the implementation and perception of 
an efficient neighbourhood policy originally 
designed to promote the EU’s own strategic 
interests. The causal link between the imperial 
nature and a superficial dominance of normative 
programming in the bilateral agendas of ENP 
highlights the importance of becoming aware 
of that nature. To overcome the geopolitical-
normative ambiguity, a conscious re-balancing of 
both components in favor of realist short and mid-
term measures in response to challenges arising in 
the neighbourhood is necessary.
The imperial nature of the EU is based on 
three essential elements. First, a certain system of 
governance: Overlapping zones of various levels 
of integration in Europe and its neighborhood. 
Such flexible means of governance have their 
merits particularly in ethnically, confessionally, 
and along other lines divided regions, prevalent 
in the European periphery. Second, a geopolitical 
mindset – based on an asymmetrical distribution 
of power – emphasizing as core objective the 
stabilization of the peripheries. Third, a civilizing 
mission of European norm diffusion, aiming at the 
creation of a favorable “external environment by 
socializing third countries to one’s way of doing 
things”4 and assuming the “normative project of 
the West”5.
Geopolitical mindset and imperial mission 
as external elements of an Empire cause the 
ambivalence within the EU’s external behavior, 
caught between the principles of stability and 
convergence. The first resembling the imperative 
of a conventional, possession- and goal-oriented 
foreign policy, the second serving as internal 
legitimacy in absence of a narrow national identity 
and – given imperial success – socialization of 
4  Tom Casier (2010) The European Neighborhood Policy: 
Assessing the EU’s Policy toward the Region, in: Frederiga Bindi 
(ed.), The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing 
Europe’s Role in the World, Washington DC: Brookings, 99-119, 
102.
5  A formulation of the German historian Heinrich-August Winkler, 
cited in: Volker Steinkamp (2013) The West and the Rest, FAZ, 
07.10.2013, 7. 
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elites in neighbouring countries. In European 
foreign policy, convergence usually trumps the 
stability principle, which can be explained by 
the evolution of the Union’s external relations: 
ENP was designed as a spin-off of Enlargement 
policy and maintained its inner logic of accession. 
In other words, blinded by its most successful 
foreign policy tool of accession politics, the EU 
sticks to its strategy of normative programming, 
benchmarking, monitoring – publishing progress 
reports which evaluate annually how far the 
neighbours came along the track of finally 
resembling ‘us’.
Despite EU rhetoric, the realist stability 
principle became more dominant. As 
considerations of stability increasingly surfaced, 
target countries of ENP became growingly 
suspicious. Problems of adopting the norm corset 
of the EU aside, a Union acting more conventional 
behind a ‘normative fig leaf’ is in danger of being 
accused of adopting double standards much more 
vehemently. Recent public opinion polls indicate 
a declining image.6 This constitutes an imperial 
dilemma the EU currently faces in its Southern 
neighbourhood. 
Dynamics of the imperial nature of ENP can 
be shown well in the case study of Lebanon. 
Lebanon appears, besides Israel, as the most 
democratic and pluralistic country in the Southern 
neighbourhood. Thus, on the one hand the 
ambitious norm agenda targeting a harmonization 
of European and partner countries’ standards in 
theory fell on fertile ground. On the other hand, 
from the start in 2005, progress reports blamed 
the overall political situation for the impasse 
in moving forward on the ‘mutually’ agreed 
reform agenda, which increasingly prioritized the 
principle of stability. The main objectives reflect a 
rather realist agenda: 1) consolidation of Lebanese 
sovereignty (e.g. border management to avoid 
the smuggling of goods and weapons to/from 
Syria); 2) strengthening the Lebanese state and 
its political institutions (e.g. role of Hezbollah, 
electoral reform, national dialogue); and 3) 
6  GlobeScan, Views of Europe Slide Sharply in Global Poll, While 
Views of China Improve http://www.globescan.com/84-press-
releases-2012/186-views-of-europe-slide-sharply-in-global-poll-
while-views-of-china-improve.html (last access: 06.01.2014)
stabilization of Lebanon in its neighborhood, 
until 2011 this comprised foremost the adherence 
of the cease-fire with Israel and since then the 
containment of spillovers of the Syrian war into 
the country. Despite this shift in priorities, annual 
progress reports since 2008 are based on the 
results on the ENP reform agenda spelled out by 
the Action Plan. As a consequence the role of the 
EU in Lebanon remains underestimated.
The first chapter of the paper conceptualizes 
the EU’s imperial politics. The second section 
analyzes contents of the bilateral agenda until 
2011, as formulated in the Action Plan, which 
can be compared with 19th century ‘standards 
of civilization’ developed by European states; 
whereas the stabilization policies resemble 
geopolitical projecting during the era of 
imperialism. The third part examines the role 
of the EU in Lebanon since 2011, especially in 
light of the “three M-approach” (money, markets, 
mobility) introduced by the revised ENP and a 
more stability oriented security agenda to advocate 
more honesty in Europe’s external relations by 
acknowledging the imperial nature of the Union.
2. The EU’s imperial politics
When addressing the actorness of the European 
Union in global politics two schools of thought 
collide7: Inclusive discourses focusing on 
the relevance of common norms and values 
(democracy, rule of law, human rights) and 
highlighting concepts of soft power. The inclusive 
school observes the EU either as ‘normative 
power’, one that diffuses universal norms, or as 
‘civilian power’, projecting its own understanding 
of norms to the rest of the world.8 Opposed to them, 
7  Charlotte Bretherton/ John Vogler (2006) Nature of the Beast: 
the identity and roles of the EU, in: Bretherton/ Vogler (eds.), 
The European Union as a Global Actor, London: Routledge, 
37-62, 41 f. See as well Mathias Jopp/ Peter Schlotter (Hrsg.) 
(2007) Kollektive Außenpolitik – Die Europäische Union als 
internationaler Akteur, IEP-Reihe Europäische Schriften, Bd. 86, 
Baden-Baden: Nomos.
8  Federica Bicchi (2006) Our size fits all: Normative power Europe 
and the Mediterranean, Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2), 
286–303, 287; on ‘civilian power’ see e.g. François Duchêne 
(1972) Europe’s Role in World Peace, in: R. Mayne (ed.), Europe 
Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, London: Fontana, 
32-47; on ‘normative power’ see e.g. Ian Manners (2002) 
Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms? Journal of 
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Bretherton and Vogler conceptualize the more 
realist exclusive discourses based on protectionism, 
a ‘Fortress Europe’ build upon exclusionary 
practices like subsidies, health standards etc. 
These accounts converge around “relatively fixed 
geographical and cultural boundaries” as what is 
to be considered European”.9 Reading the EU as 
empire allows combining both approaches.
Imperial politics resemble a structure of 
domination based on asymmetrical distribution 
of power. Furthermore, “an empire is a 
geographically extensive group of states and 
peoples (ethnic groups) united. (…) An imperial 
political structure is established and maintained 
(…) as a coercive, hegemonic empire of indirect 
conquest and control with power.”10 The imperial 
nature of the Union essentially rests on three 
elements: political structure, external behavior 
based on a geopolitical mindset and a sense of 
civilizing mission.11
The imperial structure is established on vertical 
and horizontal multi-dimensional governance, 
leading to a ‘variable geometry’ of vertically 
arranged supranational, national, regional, and 
local authorities, enmeshed in horizontally 
overarching policy networks and resulting in 
constant “negotiations among nested governments 
at several territorial tiers”12. Such flexible 
arrangements allow different grades of autonomy 
for its members and constant negotiations 
between the imperial core and the regions in 
Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235-258.
9  Charlotte Bretherton/ John Vogler (2006) Nature of the Beast: 
the identity and roles of the EU, in: Bretherton/ Vogler, The 
European Union as a Global Actor, London: Routledge, 37-62, 
38; see e.g. Adrian Hyde-Price (2006) ‘Normative’ power Europe: 
A realist critique, Journal of European Public Policy, 13(1), 217–
234; for the South: Stefano Costalli (2009) Power over the sea: 
The relevance of neoclassical realism to Euro-Mediterranean 
relations, Mediterranean Politics, 14(3), 323–342; for the East: 
Andrey Makarychev/ Andrey Devyatkov (2014) The EU in 
Eastern Europe: Has Normative Power become Geopolitical? 
PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 310, February.
10  A popular definition of “Empire” provided by Wikipedia, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empire (last access: 10.04.2014).
11  Cp. Jan Zielonka’s ideas on imperial structures, behavior 
and mission, in: Jan Zielonka (2012) Empires and the Modern 
International System, Geopolitics, 17(3), 502-525.
12  Gary Marks (1993) Structural policy and Multi-level governance 
in the EC, in: Alan Cafruny/ Glenda Rosenthal (eds.), The State 
of the European Community: The Maastricht Debate and Beyond, 
Boulder (CO), 391-411, 392.
bilateral frameworks. Empires usually represent 
a reduction in integration from the centre to the 
periphery, as concentric circles, corresponding to 
decreasing adherence to the common body of law 
and diminishing possibilities to take part in the 
decision making process of the centre.13 For the 
EU, imperial fluidity was further strengthened by 
differentiated integration – capable of integrating 
non-EU members. It includes: 1) enhanced 
cooperation, which allows a group of states to 
advance integration in any area without other 
members being involved14; 2) opt-out clauses 
(e.g. for Denmark and the UK in the Euro zone 
or Schengen area)15; or 3) transition periods within 
the accession treaties (e.g. for free movement 
of labour within the single market for the new 
member states of 2004).16
Imperial power rests on a series of concentric 
circles based on abating legal bindings of the 
periphery towards the core (behavior). Empires 
follow a geopolitical logic of appeasing their 
peripheral regions by investing a considerable 
share of their wealth into the development of 
adjacent territories.17 In bilateral arrangements 
various degrees of integration are established, thus 
imperial rule frazzles on the edges in not clearly 
demarked border areas. “This does not imply that 
borders are non-existent, rather actors perceive 
13  Herfried Münkler (2005) Imperien. Die Logik der Weltherrschaft 
– vom Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten, Berlin: Rowohlt, 
17; cp. Julian Pänke (2013) The Empire Strikes Back: 1989, 2011 
and Europe’s Neighbourhood Policy, in: Astrid B. Boening/ Jan-
Frederik Kremer/ Aukje van Loon (eds.), Global Power Europe 
(Vol. 2): Policies, Actions and Influence of the EU’s External 
Relations, Berlin: Springer, 111-129; Adam Watson (1992) The 
Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical 
Analysis, London: Routledge, 16.
14  In March 2011 this procedure was introduced for European 
divorce law and patents.
15  The Schengen area comprises 26 members, of which three 
countries (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland) are non-members of 
the EU – the UK and Ireland opted-out. The Euro zone currently 
has 18 members with Denmark and the UK opting out and 
Montenegro and Kosovo as non-members using the Euro as 
national currency.
16  Steven Blockmans (ed.) (2014) Differentiated Integration in the 
EU – From the inside looking out, Brussels: Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS); Claus Giering (1997) Vertiefung durch 
Differenzierung – Flexibilisierungskonzepte in der aktuellen 
Reformdebatte, Integration, 20(2), 72-83.
17  Cp. Herfried Münkler (2005) Imperien. Die Logik der Weltherrschaft – 
vom Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten, Berlin: Rowohlt, 9.
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their location and significance to be variable and 
somewhat open to manipulation. As such, borders 
do not separate equal political entities, instead 
they represent grades of power and influence.”18 
Brussels emphasized such a “ring of well-
governed states” in the European Security Strategy 
as well as in ENP, conveying the “image of an 
EU that will be ‘fading out’ towards its external 
borders”19, while establishing the principle of 
stability. From that perspective, the Union may 
still apply soft, civilian or normative policy tools 
but is quite aware of the unequal power relations 
between itself and its neighbours. Increasingly the 
EU displays the willingness to use that power to 
pursue its foreign policy interests, thus being first 
and foremost interested in securing itself.
Due to internal heterogeneity and the absence 
of a narrow national identity, imperial identities 
provide legitimacy by projecting some higher aim 
or mission to the exterior. Ideologies and narratives 
might differ, e.g. supporting the spread of freedom 
and democracy or the diffusion of socialism, 
but imperial missions in any case pretend to be 
an instrument against the eruption of chaos. In 
case of the EU this mission is represented by the 
“normative project of the West”20, through the ‘re-
unification of Europe’ and successful socialization 
of Central and Eastern European elites in the 
accession process between 1993 and 2004 the 
principle of convergence sustained essential 
ground of legitimacy. As a result ENP after 2003 
appeared somewhat trapped in Enlargement,21 
staying on track of the external dimension of 
internal politics, in line with constructivism 
and ‘critical geography’ of “‘defining authority’ 
proclaiming political and legal standards which 
function as apparently ‘objective’ and which 
18  Karen Barkey (2008) Empire of Difference. The Ottomans in 
Comparative Perspective, Cambridge: Harvard UP, 21.
19  Raffaella A. Del Sarto/ Tobias Schumacher (2005) From EMP to 
ENP: What’s at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy 
towards the Southern Mediterranean? European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 10, 17-38, 26.
20  See footnote 5.
21  On similarities of Enlargement and ENP see Tom Casier (2010) 
The European Neighborhood Policy: Assessing the EU’s Policy 
toward the Region, in: Frederiga Bindi (ed.), The Foreign Policy 
of the European Union: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World, 
Washington DC: Brookings, 99-119.
have to be accepted for participating in the game 
of power”22 – a civilizing mission23 – with the 
intention to gradually expand Europe’s zone of 
influence by socializing the neighbouring elites 
to adopt the European ways of doing things. But 
since a clear membership perspective was omitted, 
the EU’s transformative power lost its appeal.
The European Union as Empire was established 
after the end of the Cold War. Brussels external 
activities in the Eastern half of the continent 
established those legal concepts, principles 
and rules that govern today’s union. Eastern 
Enlargement and the implementation of the single 
market realized multi-dimensional governance in 
the 1990s, creating overlapping zones of various 
degrees of integration. The year 1993 marked the 
formulation of the Copenhagen Criteria which 
defined the benchmarks for joining the union, thus 
formulating common values to the exterior for the 
first time; and the Treaty of Maastricht allowed 
for differentiated integration in the future.
As in the 19th century, imperial rule of the EU 
is based on politics of ‘standards of civilization’, 
comprising three general features: “first, the 
general self-perception of European states as those 
who authoritatively define the standards; second, 
regulations which define different steps and 
paces of cooperation between European and non-
European states; and finally a geopolitical model 
projecting a world order with European states at 
the centre and zones of less politically developed 
states at the peripheries.”24 Harmonization 
is monitored in evaluation procedures in the 
tradition of imperial bureaucracy in the 19th 
century that “occupied itself (…) with classifying 
people and their attributes; with censuses, 
22  Hartmut Behr (2007) The European Union in the Legacies of 
Imperial Rule? EU Accession Politics Viewed from a Historical 
Perspective, European Journal of International Relations, 13.2 
(February), 239-262, 241.
23  In a civilizing process described by Norbert Elias, see 
Norbert Elias (1939) The Civilizing Process. Sociogenetic and 
Psychogenetic Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell (2000).
24  Hartmut Behr (2007) The European Union in the Legacies of 
Imperial Rule? EU Accession Politics Viewed from a Historical 
Perspective, European Journal of International Relations, 13(2), 
239-262, 240; cp. Ole Wæver (1997) Emerging European 
Analogies to Pre-Nation State Imperial Systems, in: Ola Tunander/ 
Pavel Baev/ Victoria Einagel (eds), Geopolitics in Post-Wall 
Europe: Security, Territory, and Identity, London: Sage, 59-93.
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surveys, and ethnographies; with recording 
transactions, marking space, establishing routines, 
and standardizing practices.”25 On their annual 
tours, EU representatives appraised, through the 
use of ‘safeguards’, ‘benchmarks’, ‘monitoring’ 
and ‘screening’, the ‘progress’ of the accession 
candidates26 - and now the ENP countries. 
Perceptions of this asymmetrical relationship, 
contradicting all claims of joint ownership, were 
further intensified by a long history of colonialism 
in the European neighbourhood – in the East 
by German actors (as Prussia, Habsburg, the 
German Reich) or Russia (USSR), in the South 
by direct colonialization by European powers like 
Great Britain, Italy or – as in case of Lebanon 
– France. These individual imperial legacies 
further complicate EU politics in the Southern 
Mediterranean.
Imperial politics mix conventional stability 
policy in the sense of security politics and a 
strategic foreign policy of long-term norm 
diffusion aiming at a sustainable transformation – 
and thus deeper stabilization – of the peripheries. 
A “strategic use of norms (democracy promotion, 
human rights, market logic)”27 is established 
but ENP rhetoric of ownership and a symmetric 
partnership is not accompanied by a restructuring 
of hierarchical patterns of interaction. Since the 
EU uses instruments of the hard power toolkit 
(financial support, market access), there remains 
a hesitation to consider the EU as adopting a 
“soft imperialism” or as an “empire lite”28. From 
25  Cooper, Frederick/ Laura Ann Stoler (1997) Between Metropole 
and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda, in: Cooper/ Stoler 
(eds), Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois 
World, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1-56, 11.
26  Alan Posener (2007) Imperium der Zukunft. Warum Europa 
Weltmacht werden muss, München: Pantheon, 94; cp. cp. Julian 
Pänke (2013) The Empire Strikes Back: 1989, 2011 and Europe’s 
Neighbourhood Policy, in: Astrid B. Boening/ Jan-Frederik 
Kremer/ Aukje van Loon (eds.), Global Power Europe (Vol. 2): 
Policies, Actions and Influence of the EU’s External Relations, 
Berlin: Springer, 111-129, 119.
27  Björn Hettne/ Fredrik Söderbaum (2005) Civilian Power or 
Soft Imperialism? The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of 
Interregionalism, European Foreign Affairs Rewiev, 10(4), 535-
552, 550.
28  Michael Ignatieff (2003) The American Empire: The Burden, 
New York Times Magazine, 05.01.2003, http://www.nytimes.
com/2003/01/05/magazine/the-american-empire-the-burden.
html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (last access: 22.03.2012).
the perspective of its partner countries, the EU’s 
norms and values run danger to be perceived like 
an ideology in a Marxian sense, as concealing 
and therefore legitimizing actual distributions 
of power. The EU has to overcome the negative 
repercussions of its image in its neighbourhood 
and at the same time – seemingly contradictory – 
learn to deal with its imperial nature.
3. EU-Lebanese Relations un-
til 2011: ENP – a ‘normative 
fig leaf’
In parallel to the establishment of imperial 
Europe and the development of EU foreign policy 
instruments in the 1990s, the Europeans have 
gradually increased their political involvement 
and moved to assert their interests in the 
Near East more forcefully. These interests are 
largely inspired by geographic proximity and 
geopolitical considerations and include perceived 
security threats emanating from the Southern 
neighborhood; mainly spillover of conflicts, 
terrorism, organized crime, or uncontrolled 
migration.29 While the Union was increasingly 
guided by security considerations and willing to 
project its power in the neighbourhood, the civilian 
agenda of democracy and human rights promotion 
was threatened to be perceived as ‘normative fig 
leaf’.
Lebanon should be the perfect target country 
in the Southern neighbourhood for diffusing 
normative policies, as it does “not present the 
same authoritarian institutions and character as 
other Arab countries in the region.”30 At the same 
time, security considerations favor the adoption of 
less ambitious and more conventional approaches 
to stability. The civil war from 1975 to 1990, the 
continuing conflict with Israel and the spillovers 
from the war in Syria can jeopardize Europe’s 
security. Political leadership in Lebanon is based 
29  Cp. Muriel Asseburg (2009) European Conflict Management in 
the Middle East: Toward a More Effective Approach, Carnegie 
Papers, No. 14 (Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut), Berlin: 
SWP, February, 1.
30  Peter Seeberg (2009) The EU as a realist actor in normative 
clothes: EU democracy promotion in Lebanon and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, Democratization, 16(1), 81-99, 82.
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on a “cross-sectarian power sharing pact”; five 
groups can be identified among the Lebanese 
elites: religious rebels (including Hezbollah, 
Sunni salafist movements), Syria’s clients, the 
entrepreneurs (among them the Hariri clan), and 
military personnel.31
In 2005, when the first Country Report in 
preparation of an Association Agreement was 
published, Lebanon and the EU already had strong 
trade relations and the member states and Brussels 
were the main financial contributors to Lebanon. 
In 2006 the Association Agreement was signed, 
followed by the Action Plan of 2007, which 
serves as base for the ambitious reform agenda 
of ENP and seeks to  “significantly advance the 
approximation of Lebanon’s legislation, norms 
and standards to those of the European Union”32 
in the spirit of convergence. While adapting to 
Lebanese realities, Brussels quickly reduced 
the agenda to rather short-term stabilization of 
political institutions – as electoral reform and 
supporting the national dialogue. And as a result, 
European politics adopted a realist agenda aiming 
at short-term stability, emphasizing “the important 
objective of restoring Lebanon’s full sovereignty 
and territorial integrity” and the importance of 
the overall regional stable security environment33 
as the sine qua non precondition for all further 
attempts of reform. 
All three elements of European imperial 
politics (authority, behaviour, mission) are 
easily identifiable in the EU’s politics towards 
Lebanon. Contents of the EU documents 
rhetorically emphasize transformation and 
gradual convergence of Lebanese with European 
standards, while promoting conventional foreign 
policies serving the Union’s security interests. 
Unfortunately the security agenda appears 
somewhat hidden in the documents, causing the 
31  Ibid., 84; on Lebanon see e.g. Theodor Hanf (1993) Coexistence 
in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation. 
Oxford: Oxford UP; Rola El-Husseini (2004) Lebanon: Building 
Political Dynasties, in: Volker Perthes (ed.): Arab Elites: 
Negotiating the Politics of Change, London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 239-266; Fawwaz Traboulsi (2007) A History of 
Modern Lebanon, London: Pluto Press.
32  Ibid., 2.
33  European Neighbourhood Policy (2007) EU-Lebanon Action 
Plan, 1.
impression of an instrumental use of normative 
ambitions. This misperception is the result of 
a one-size-fits-all approach to norm diffusion 
carried out by bureaucratic imperial agencies – 
in this case the EU commission – resulting in a 
technocratic process unaware of the realities on 
the ground and thus merely imitating meaningful 
cooperation.
The ENP EU-Lebanon Action Plan was 
adopted by the European Union in October 2006 
and by Lebanon in January 2007; opening the 
“perspective of moving beyond cooperation to 
a significant degree of economic integration, 
including a stake in the EU’s Internal Market, 
and the possibility for Lebanon to participate 
progressively in key aspects of EU policies and 
programmes”34 through normative programming. 
The political dialogue section emphasizes to 
“work together to promote the shared values 
of democracy and the rule of law including 
good governance and transparent, stable and 
effective institutions.”35 This represents a 
typical formulation for an ideal and non-binding 
narrative. Behind the ambitious reform agenda, 
hard security interests surface in the sections on 
cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and 
security as well as regional and international 
issues. These passages demand that Lebanon 
should “prevent and control illegal immigration 
into Lebanon and the European Union” by 
improving “cooperation regarding readmission of 
own nationals, stateless persons and third country 
nationals”36 Thus, since internal security of Europe 
is understandably of paramount importance, 
Brussels in line with similar documents in the 
Southern Neighbourhood, focuses on migration 
issues. Furthermore, the Union is softening the 
bilateral approach by highlighting its regional 
interests since the main objective is to “promote 
(…) once conditions are favourable, a Euro-
Mediterranean Peace and Stability Charter.”37 
34  European Neighbourhood Policy (2007) EU-Lebanon Action 
Plan, 2.
35  Ibid., 4.
36  Ibid., 18.
37  European Neighbourhood Policy (2007) EU-Lebanon Action 
Plan, 7+8. Cp. Peter Seeberg (2009) The EU as a realist actor in 
normative clothes: EU democracy promotion in Lebanon and the 
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The fixation on the ambitious goals of 
normative programming in the Action Plan 
leads to an unbalanced evaluation of EU politics 
in Lebanon. The annual Progress Reports (for 
Lebanon published since 2008) focus on the 
process of harmonization and in a technocratic 
procedure run through the reform agenda and mark 
with checks all accomplished goals. The Reports 
covering the years 2007-2011 were basically 
critical with very few positive expressions on 
acknowledging slow progress in fields of human 
rights, judicial reform, social sector reform and 
trade issues. Besides the technocratic nature of 
monitoring, which led to a somewhat simulated 
cooperation, the complex political realities 
hindered any substantial progress along the track 
of convergence. The May 2008 clashes between 
the government and Hezbollah let to a political 
deadlock which blocked draft laws in line with 
the Action Plan.38 In context of the June 2009 
parliamentary elections, “progress was achieved 
in the area of electoral reform”; accompanied by 
an EU Election Observation Mission (EOM).39 
In 2010, “the controversy over the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon tasked with investigating 
the killing of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri 
(…) polarised the Lebanese political arena and 
paralysed the functioning of key institutions 
including parliament and the cabinet. Due to the 
political impasse, the Lebanese parliament was 
not able to adopt a significant number of laws, 
which are essential for the implementation of the 
ENP Action Plan.”40 The example of Lebanon 
shows that the continued focus on convergence 
in the spirit of Enlargement is destined to fail in 
light of the political realities in the Southern ENP 
countries, worsened by imperial agencies far away 
from their potential partners; and bound to invite 
European Neighbourhood Policy, Democratization, 16(1), 81-99, 
81.
38  European Commission (2009) Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in 2008, Progress Report Lebanon, Staff 
Working Document SEC(2009) 518/2, Brussels, 23.04.2009.
39  European Commission (2010) Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in 2009, Progress Report Lebanon, Staff 
Working Document SEC(2010) 522, Brussels, 12.05.2010.
40  European Commission (2011) Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in 2010, Country Report: Lebanon, Joint 
Staff Working Paper SEC(2011) 637, Brussels, 25.05.2011, 2.
misunderstandings concerning the evaluation of 
quality and impact of EU’s neighbourhood policy.
The declared objectives in the ENP documents 
concerning Lebanon are predominantly 
normative, while the Union actually considers 
its own security, e.g. embedding Lebanon into a 
the regional context and focusing on migration 
issues. Analysts identify “a dramatic mismatch 
between short-term realist-inspired instruments 
promoted by the ENP in Lebanon and the highly 
idealistic and constructivist objectives that call 
for the shared values of democracy and rule of 
law”41. This is a result of a normative-geopolitical 
ambiguity originating in the imperial nature of the 
EU. The internal exchange values of the principle 
of convergence as ground for new legitimacy 
gained strength by the failed public referenda in 
France and the Netherlands in May 2005 on a 
European constitution; visible in the Action Plans 
of the Southern neighbourhood and seemed to 
dominate at least until 2011. The ENP’s normative 
agenda runs danger to be “incomprehensible 
to both member and partner states”, while 
demotivating both parties.42 The Action Plans turn 
into “an objective per se and instead of supporting 
integration they will be merely imitating the 
process.”43 To accomplish a fair evaluation of 
EU politics in the Near East, Brussels has to 
reconsider its imperial nature, strengthen positive 
readings of political outcomes in stabilization in 
favor of its transformation record.
4. EU-Lebanese Relations 
since 2011: Increased im-
pact due to more realism on 
the ground
Uprisings in the Arab states with their geopolitical 
implications along with changes of the Treaty of 
Lisbon concerning EU foreign policy, represented 
a shift away from normative expectations; the 
first demanded a new focus on stability and the 
41  Ibid., 573.
42  On the Eastern Partnership: Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz 
(2011) Integration or Imitation? EU policy towards its Eastern 
Neighbours, OSW Studies, issue 36, April, Warsaw: OSW, 10.
43  Ibid., 12. 
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second created the institutional capacities for a 
new approach to implementing ENP. The EEAS 
enhances the local room of manoeuvre and allows 
‘tailor made responses’ of the Union. With the 
beginning of the war in Syria in March 2011, 
the context of EU-Lebanese relations changed 
significantly. The war forced the institutions 
in Brussels and the EU Delegation in Beirut 
established in January of the same year to quickly 
adopt to new circumstances in the country which 
naturally required a stronger focus on short-term 
stability and pushed the reform agenda of the 
Action Plan to the side. As successor to Patrick 
Laurent, Angelina Eichhorst as new head of 
the Delegation enjoyed more competences and 
had a significantly higher impact on EU politics 
in Lebanon than the former Delegation of the 
Commission. To stabilize an increasingly fragile 
security situation Eichhorst, reflecting the EU’s 
normative-geopolitical ambiguity, emphasized 
that the EU should “provide both ‘soft’ assistance 
to address social issues like lack of education 
and jobs, combined with more ‘hard’ power by 
furnishing aid to the security services and the 
Lebanese Army.”44
The involvement of Lebanese actors in the 
Syrian conflict lead to intensifying eruptions 
of violence since summer 2011; e.g. visible 
in fights between between Sunni and Alawite 
neighbourhoods in the Northern city of Tripoli. 
In politics, the Syrian conflict aggravated the 
tensions between the government coalition and 
the pro-Syrian opposition on the controversial 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), probing 
the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq 
Hariri in February 2005. The gridlock on the STL 
led to the toppling of PM Saad Hariri in January 
2011, mainly by Hezbollah. The wealthy Sunni 
entrepreneur Najib Mikati formed a Hezbollah-
led coalition in June 2011. Despite Hezbollah 
dominating the government, Mikati emphasized 
the importance of neutrality and successfully 
negotiated the Baabda Declaration of June 2012, 
hallmarking the disassociation of all Lebanese 
44  Interview with Kareem Shaheen (2014) Cabinet proof there is 
hope for deal: EU envoy, The Daily Star (Lebanon), 19.02.2014.
actors from the conflict in Syria.45 
In 2013, the spillovers of the Syrian war were 
highly visible. Borders are as porous as ever, and 
the spiraling refugee crisis needs close attention. 
As of January 2014 there are nearly 930,000 
refugees, registered with UNHCR, in Lebanon 
who fled the violence in Syria since the start of 
the crisis. Lebanese officials repeatedly called 
the international community for more support to 
help the country to deal with the crisis. Based on 
official numbers, Syrian refugees represent 25% 
of the current population in Lebanon, turning 
it into the country with the world’s highest per-
capita concentration of refugees worldwide.46 
Since political leadership in Lebanon is still 
composed along dynastical lines, and the militias 
of the civil war – a war in which Syria had 
played a decisive role – are mirrored in today’s 
political structures, the present refugees create 
an extremely sensitive security environment by 
destabilizing the socio-economic environment and 
the balance of political forces. In October 2012, 
the bomb attack on Internal Security Forces (ISF) 
General Wissam al-Hassan reintroduced political 
assassinations to the streets of Lebanon. In the 
first months of 2013, supporters of the rebels in 
Syria, followers of Hezbollah and the Lebanese 
Armed Forces (LAF) clashed in the Northeastern 
Bekaa valley, close to the contested areas in Syria 
around Homs and the corridor linking Aleppo 
and Damascus. Sunni sheikhs with salafist 
ideologies, called for Jihad in Syria and attacked 
Hezbollah as supporters of the Assad regime. As 
Lebanese actors got increasingly involved (border 
smuggling of weapons and fighters) in the Syrian 
war – thus violating the Baabda declaration – 
Prime Minister Mikati resigned in March 2013. 
A few weeks later, Hezbollah Secretary General 
Hassan Nasrallah openly acknowledged direct 
military involvement of the Lebanese militia 
45  Baabda Declaration issued by the National Dialogue Committee 
on 11 June 2012, 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Lebanon%20S%202012%20
477.pdf (last access: 10.01.2014)
46  Earlier on Sunday, the United Nations Higher Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) said, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/
lebanonnews/545875-eu-supports-dissociation-policy (last 
access: 04.05.2014)
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in Syria. In June, supporters of radical Sheikh 
Assir fought the LAF in the multi-confessional 
city of Sidon, south of Beirut. In the clashes 
nearly 20 soldiers died. Since fall 2013 Lebanon 
witnesses casualties in suicide bombings almost 
every week.47 The formation of a new Lebanese 
government stalled until 15 February 2014, 
when the designated Tammam Salam finally 
was inaugurated as Prime Minister of a national 
coalition government; until then, Mikati had 
remained caretaker prime minister.
Due to intensified EU-Lebanese relations 
caused by the Syrian crisis the tone of the Progress 
Reports changes significantly in 2011, reflecting 
on the reformed ENP and e.g. referring for the 
first time to individual performances of Lebanese 
politicians and clearly highlighting the stability 
principle. “The new cabinet of Prime Minister 
Najib Mikati, which took office in July, showed 
strong commitment to cooperation with the EU. 
High level visits, which were carried out, gave 
the bilateral relations an additional impetus.”48 
It concludes that “in the context of a volatile 
situation in the Arab world, and most importantly 
in the neighbouring Syria, Lebanon successfully 
preserved its political stability, sovereignty and 
internal unity due to the policy pursued by the 
government.”49 Stabilizing a deteriorating security 
situation, support of durable and legitimate 
political institutions (through timely elections 
e.g.), and reviving a depressed economy represent 
the priorities for EU politics in Lebanon since 
2011. 
Forced by the Syrian war, the EU favored quite 
efficient stability politics over the reform agenda 
47  For more information on the attacks (mainly targeting Hezbollah 
strongholds in retaliation for their active support for the Syrian 
regime), see e.g. Kareem Shaheen/ Antoine Amrieh, Syria-
linked clashes in Beirut leave on dead, Daily Star (Lebanon), 
24.03.2014; Kareem Shaheen, Twin suicide car bombings kill 
six in Beirut, Daily Star (Lebanon), 19.02.2014; Dana Khraiche, 
Suspected suicide bombing in Beirut suburb kills four, Daily 
Star (Lebanon), 21.02.2014; Dana Khraiche, Car bomb in Beirut 
kills four, wound 77, Daily Star (Lebanon), 02.02.2014; Rima 
Aboulmona, Suicide Bomber kill 25 near Iran Embassy in Beirut, 
Daily Star (Lebanon), 19.11.2013.
48  European Commission (2012) Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in Lebanon: Progress in 2011 and 
recommendations for action, Joint Staff Working Document 
SWD(2012) 117 final, Brussels, 15.05.2012, 2.
49  Ibid., 2.
formulated in the Action Plan; significantly 
strengthening Brussels’ influence in Lebanon 
and better anticipating the expectations in the 
Southern neighbourhood. Opinion polls of the 
EU Neighbourhood Barometer indicate, that the 
societies in the Southern ENP would appreciate 
a focus on the principle of stability more than a 
continued focus on convergence. Among the 
‘most beneficial areas of EU and ENPI South’, 
respondents highlighted: Trade 26%, Tourism 
23%, Economic Development 21%, than 
Democracy 18%, Education 15%. On ‘most 
important areas’: Peace and security 40%, Trade 
36%, than Human Rights 25%. Focus in the 
future should be: Peace and security 31%, Trade 
18%, Human Rights 14%.50 A less ambitious 
reform agenda enables the Union to move beyond 
colonial history with its hierarchical patterns of 
claimed ‘superiority’ and diffuse the continued 
“suspicion and mistrust of European initiatives 
to disseminate its values, norms, structures, 
and institutions to the southern partners. (…) 
[questioning] the intensions and credibility of that 
hegemonic power to the north,”51 as Sally Khalifa 
Isaac Atwan noted. 
The political impact of the Union is now 
analyzed in terms of the adopted “three 
M-approach” (money, markets and mobility), 
and given the fragile security environment, 
complemented by EU initiatives addressing 
security.
Money
The EU is Lebanon’s most important trading 
partner (followed by Syria and the United States): 
it accounted for 29% of Lebanon’s total trade in 
2011, amounting to €5.6 billion. Exports to the EU 
represent around 11%; Lebanese imports from the 
EU amount to 38% of Lebanese trade. 52 Since the 
mid-1990s, the EU has been the leading donor to 
50  ENPI – EU Neighbourhood Barometer, Autumn 2012, 
20.03.2013, 19.
51  Sally Khalifa Isaac Atwan (2010) The Quest for Intercultural 
Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Region: Opportunities and 
Challenges, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS, 2010/74, Florence: 
EUI, 13; cp. Sheila Carapico (2001) Euro-Med: European 
Ambitions in the Mediterranean, Middle East Report, No. 220 
(Autumn), 25-27.
52  Ibid., 10.
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Lebanon. The total amounts of funds committed 
under MEDA I (1995-1999) were €182 million, 
€235 million under MEDA II (2000–2006), €187 
million under the European Neighborhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) (2007-2010), and 
€150 million 2011-2013.53
The annual support, amounting to 
approximately €50 million, was expanded to help 
Lebanon handling the Syrian refugee crisis. Until 
December 2013, the European Commission has 
allocated an additional €222.8 million. Of these 
funds, €85 million have been contracted through 
the ENPI budget to the Lebanese government; 
whereas the remaining €135.3 million are 
channeled via the Humanitarian Office of the 
European Commission (ECHO) through UN 
agencies and NGOs.54 The financial support 
makes the EU the most important contributor 
in the refugee crisis in Lebanon, and represents 
a remarkable commitment of the Union; given 
the tragic role refugees had played in the past 
of Lebanon’s violent history; when Palestinian 
refugees after being expelled from Jordan were 
an important factor in igniting the Civil War in 
the mid 1970s. EU funding in the refugee crisis 
helped substantially to stabilize the country and 
gave Brussels considerable leverage in Lebanese 
politics, if financial instruments could be applied 
more flexible to be capable to react quickly to 
short-term challenges this leverage would be 
much higher.
Markets
Stakes in the EU’s Internal Market represent a 
potentially very powerful tool of ENP. The EU 
Delegation in Lebanon indicated potential uses: 
The work force of the Syrian refugees represents 
a serious security risk to the social fabrique of 
Lebanon – especially in the agricultural areas of 
the North and the Bekaa valley in the East. The EU 
has identified socio-economic measures as helpful 
leverage to avoid a radicalization of farmers in 
these areas by stabilizing their profits though 
53  Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Lebanon, 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-
cooperation/lebanon/lebanon_en.htm (last access: 12.01.2014)
54  Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Lebanon, 
EU response to the Syrian crisis, 16.12.2013.
competitive pricing, when facing the challenge 
of Syrian agricultural goods flooding the market 
and cheap labor provided by Syrian refugees. In 
summer 2013, in order to alleviate pressure from 
rural Lebanon and to avoid the Syrian war to 
spread, the European Commission allowed imports 
of ware potatoes not intended for planting, and 
originating from the two most important Lebanese 
agricultural production regions of Akkar (in the 
North) and the Bekaa valley.55 Lebanese potatoes 
were sold on the internal market or exported 
to Jordan and Turkey, now transport routes are 
blocked by the war in Syria and prices cannot 
compete with Syrian potatoes offered at dumping 
prices. The decision will allow Lebanon to benefit 
from a 50.000 tons duty free quota for potatoes 
negotiated under the EU-Lebanon Association 
Agreement. The political intention is explicitly 
mentioned.56 Currently the EU considers similar 
arrangements for other agricultural good as well, 
as honey, dairy products and meat. The biggest 
challenge remains the high sanitary standards to 
export them to the Union. Thus, the Delegation in 
Lebanon gives grants for rural developers to keep 
employment stable and projects which enhance 
the sanitary quality in the mid-term.57
Mobility
ENP highlights the importance of “people-to-
people”-contacts and the necessity of mobility 
partnerships to facilitate visa processing – 
especially for students and active participants 
of civil society. As mentioned earlier, the Union 
focused very much on its own security by 
55  European Commission (2013) Implementing Decision of 30 July 
2013 authorising Member States to provide for derogations from 
certain provisions of Council Directive 2000/29/EC in respect of 
potatoes, other than potatoes intended for planting, originating 
in the regions of Akkar and Bekaa of Lebanon (notified under 
document C(2013) 4683) (2013/413/EU), Official Journal of the 
European Union, L 205/13.
56  “The possibility to export potatoes into the European Union is 
expected to provide substantial economic opportunity, particularly 
for those agricultural regions most affected by the impact of 
the Syrian crisis.” Lebanon Potatoes to EU – Now possible for 
Lebanon to export potatoes from Akkar and the Bekaa to the 
European Union (09/09/2013)
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/press_corner/all_news/
news/2013/20130909_2_en.htm? (last access: 17.01.2014)
57  Interview with EU diplomats at the European Delegation, Beirut, 
14.01.2014.
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highlighting illegal immigration into Lebanon and 
the European Union.58 The failure to agree on a 
readmission clause remained the biggest obstacle 
for agreeing on a mobility partnership, similar 
to those which the Commission signed with 
Morocco in summer 2013 and Tunisia in March 
2014. A second tool for increasing mobility is the 
so-called Blue Card – an EU-wide work permit 
allowing high-skilled non-EU citizens to enter 
the Union’s Schengen-area.59 Applicants require 
at least 1.5 times the average gross annual salary 
paid in the Member State (€46.500 in Germany) 
and a relevant higher professional qualification 
(Master degree in Germany). So far, the initiative 
turned out to be a flop; this is mainly the fault of 
the member states, as many states had not even 
implemented the legislation after the deadline of 
June 2011. Germany had enacted the Blue Card 
legislation fully only in April 2012. As of January 
2014, Berlin issued 7.000 Blue Cards. 4.000 of 
these were given to foreigners who were already 
residing in Germany. In 2012, only 35 Lebanese 
emigrated to Germany with a Blue Card.60 Even if 
the delay in transposing the Blue Card Directive 
suggest it to be too early to draw meaningful 
conclusions, the entry hurdles seem too high of an 
obstacle to attract substantial numbers of migrants.
The EU evaluates Lebanon’s research and 
innovation potential as high, which would open 
opportunities for enhanced “people-to-people”-
contacts in that area. “According to the Global 
Innovation Index 2012, Lebanon ranked 61st in 
the world ranking of innovation, and in the 11th 
place among North African and Western Asian 
countries.”61 Until 2011 Lebanon’s participation in 
the 7th Framework Programme for Research and 
Technological Development remained limited”; 
project funds amounted to €1.8 million (since 
58  European Neighbourhood Policy (2007) EU-Lebanon Action 
Plan, 18.
59  With the exception of Denmark, Ireland, and UK; cp. Council 
Directive 2009/50/EC.
60  http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/BA-Chef-Weise-
Nur-7000-Zuwanderer-mit-Blue-Card-2073163.html - as well 
feedback of DG Home on my request (18.01.2014).
61  European Commission (2013) Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in Lebanon: Progress in 2012 and 
recommendations for action, Joint Staff Working Document 
SWD(2013) 93 final, Brussels, 20.03.2013., 16.
2007).62 In the Marie Curie programme, fostering 
international research collaboration, 13 Lebanese 
fellows participated. By 2013 funding increased 
by €2.7 million initiating new projects and 32 
participants in the Marie Curie programme.63 
The increased numbers indicate the impact of 
the EU Delegation in Beirut in raising awareness 
for EU programs and responding to difficult 
national contexts – in the Lebanese case a very 
de-centralized and heterogeneous education 
landscape. The Lebanese Scientific Research 
Council (CNRS) embracing initiatives within the 
funding framework Horizon 2020 indicate that a 
shift of EU politics has been acknowledged and 
the presence of the EU delegation is appreciated.
Beyond “three M”: Security 
A more realist focus on immediate security 
concerns started to dominate EU-Lebanese 
relations since 2011. According to the head of the 
EU Delegation in Lebanon, Angelina Eichhorst, 
the “adherence to the policy of disassociation” is 
the only way to get out of the Syrian crisis “sound 
and sane.”64 “Moreover, the EU will explore 
possibilities of strengthening the capabilities of 
Lebanese state security structures as a way to 
improve the stability of Lebanon and the stability 
of the region as a whole.”65 
In December 2011, Brussels and Lebanon 
signed a new project Developing National 
Capability for Security and Stabilisation, worth 
€12 million, further enhancing ISF (Internal 
Security Forces) organizational competences.66 
Furthermore, the Union identified support for 
62  European Commission (2012) Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in Lebanon: Progress in 2011 and 
recommendations for action, Joint Staff Working Document 
SWD(2012) 117 final, Brussels, 15.05.2012, 15.
63  European Commission (2014) Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in Lebanon: Progress in 2013 and 
recommendations for action, Joint Staff Working Document 
SWD(2014) 92 final, Brussels, 27.03.2014, 19+20.
64  Interview with Kareem Shaheen (2014) Cabinet Proof there is 
hope for deal: EU envoy, Daily Star (Lebanon), 19.02.2014.
65  European Commission (2013) Towards A Comprehensive EU 
Approach to the Syrian Crisis, Joint Communication JOIN(2013) 
22 final, Brussels, 24.06.2013, 5.
66  European Commission (2012) Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in Lebanon: Progress in 2011 and 
recommendations for action, Joint Staff Working Document 
SWD(2012) 117 final, Brussels, 15.05.2012, 5.
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the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as part of a 
comprehensive response to the Syrian war. And 
Brussels rightly identified the LAF as “well-
respected and as it is cross confessional in 
structure, it is perceived as being impartial and 
neutral.”67 The response includes the deployment 
of an EU Military Expert at the EU Delegation 
to advise on security issues and give support 
to the LAF.68 The EU strategy paper of summer 
2013 was intended to encourage EU member 
states to provide direct support to the LAF. A 
first result is the $3 billion weapon deal brokered 
between France and Saudi Arabia in December 
2013, where Riyadh provides the money to be 
invested in French military equipment; the largest 
support for the Lebanese army since Lebanese 
independence in 1943.69
Due to the growing cross-border threats from 
Syria, the EU needs to maintain its focus on 
strengthening Lebanon’s border management 
capacities, namely increased inter-agency 
co-ordination on border strategy and greater 
intelligence sharing. The Commission allocated 
the above mentioned €12 million for this aim – 
and a number of member states, including France, 
Germany and the UK, also provide individual 
support.70 The EU Progress Report 2014 
asserts that “numerous IBM [Integrated Border 
Management] awareness-raising sessions were 
conducted within the agencies involved to improve 
understanding of the IBM concept.”71 Despite the 
difficult context of strengthening border control 
in the Syrian war, stakeholder participation and 
ownership is this area was commendable, as state 
actors seem to embrace the importance to counter 
sectarian trends in security issues.
67  European Commission (2013) Towards A Comprehensive EU 
Approach to the Syrian Crisis, Joint Communication JOIN(2013) 
22 final, Brussels, 24.06.2013, 12.
68  Ibid.
69  Rainer Hermann (2013) Paris und Saudi-Arabien rüsten die 
libanesische Armee auf, FAZ, 31.12.2013, 2.
70  Julien Barnes-Dacey (2012) Lebanon: Containing Spillover from 
Syria, ECFR/61, September, 8.
71  European Commission (2014) Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in Lebanon: Progress in 2013 and 
recommendations for action, Joint Staff Working Document 
SWD(2014) 92 final, Brussels, 27.03.2014, 13 f.
Even if the EU seeks to avoid any potential 
strengthening of Hezbollah; unlike the US, the 
European Union talks to Hezbollah which holds 
“a role that will be key to ensuring that Lebanon 
does not descend into chaos.”72 As indicated by 
the before mentioned public opinion polls, the 
Union is considered as a more neutral arbiter than 
the USA or the Gulf states. The Union remains 
the most important Western actor capable of 
moderating Hezbollah and reaching out to Iran 
(e.g. in the current negotiations on Tehran’s 
nuclear program). At the same time, Brussels 
aims at strengthening Lebanese state institutions 
against Hezbollah by criticizing its declared right 
on autonomous military capacities, which turn the 
militia into a ‘state in the state’. The complicated 
relations of the Union towards Hezbollah were 
very visible in July 2013, when Brussels added 
Hezbollah’s ‘military wing’ to a list of terrorist 
organizations, “while making clear that dialogue 
with all political actors in Lebanon and cooperation 
with state institutions would continue.”73 The 
Union had to respond to accusations of Bulgarian 
authorities that Hezbollah members were involved 
in a bombing, targeting Israeli tourists in Burgas 
and intended to send a strong symbol against 
impunity while keeping channels of dialogue 
with Lebanon’s most important security actor 
open. Head of the EU Delegation, Angelina 
Eichhorst twittered in July 2013: “Our work w/
Hezbollah party members who r only politically 
active, including members of government or 
parliament, will continue.”74 And indeed it seems 
that the blacklisting of the party’s military wing 
has not substantially affected the relationship with 
Hezbollah’s political side. 
Last but not least, EU efforts focused on 
strengthening Lebanese governing institutions 
and aimed at increasing the population’s trust 
in the state and the central government. The 
72  Julien Barnes-Dacey (2012) Lebanon: Containing Spillover from 
Syria, ECFR/61, September, 7.
73  European Commission (2014) Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in Lebanon: Progress in 2013 and 
recommendations for action, Joint Staff Working Document 
SWD(2014) 92 final, Brussels, 27.03.2014, 3 f.; see as well 
Official Journal of the European Union, C 212/5, 26.07.2013.
74  Angelina Eichhorst on Twitter, 22.07.2013, https://twitter.com/
aneichhorst (last access: 17.01.2014).
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EU is especially interested in electoral reform, 
in the long-term capable of overcoming the 
confessionalist system, but more importantly 
in the short-term to preserve stability through 
legitimizing the current government. In December 
2013 and April 2014, the European Council called 
for the implementation of the Baabda Declaration, 
therefore “urging the formation of a government, 
looking forward to the timely holding of 
parliamentary and presidential elections.”75 
Indeed the continuous messaging of the Lebanese 
political actors on the importance of elections, 
remained top priority of the EU Delegation.76 
Further visible signs of intensified EU-Lebanese 
relations were high level visits of Prime Minister 
Najib Mikati to Brussels in April 2012, Catherine 
Ashton to Lebanon in October 2012, June 2013, 
as well as Commissioners Štefan Füle, Kristalina 
Georgieva and Michel Barnier in March, May and 
November 2013, respectively.77
5. Conclusion and recommen-
dations
While a majority of EU analysts focus on the 
shortcomings of the ENP, especially in the 
Southern Mediterranean,78 this paper argues that 
impact capacities are much higher than usually 
estimated. With the example of Lebanon, it shows 
75  European Commission (2014) Joint Staff Working Document, 
Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 
Lebanon: Progress in 2013 and recommendations for action, 
Joint Staff Working Document SWD(2014) 92 final, Brussels, 
27.03.2014, 3 f. 
76  See for instance Statement by the Spokesperson of EU High 
Representative Catherine Ashton on the government formation 
in Lebanon, 140215/01, Brussels, 16.02.2014; Delegation of 
the European Union to the Republic of Lebanon, Press Release, 
The European Union regrets that elections will not be held on 
time, Beirut, 31 May 2013; and Angelina Eichhorst on Twitter, 
06.02.2014, 29.01.2014, 19.01.2014, 26.12.2013… https://
twitter.com/aneichhorst
77  European Commission (2012) Implementation of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy in Lebanon: Progress in 
2011 and recommendations for action, Joint Staff Working 
Document SWD(2012) 117 final, Brussels, 15.05.2012; 
European Commission (2013) Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in Lebanon: Progress in 2012 and 
recommendations for action, Joint Staff Working Document 
SWD(2013) 93 final, Brussels, 20.03.2013, 2.
78  For the Southern Mediterranean see e.g. Thorsten Gerald 
Schneiders (Hrsg.) (2013) Der Arabische Frühling. Hintergründe 
und Analysen, Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
how successful a normatively less ambitious but 
conventionally more determined foreign policy in 
the Southern neighbourhood can be. Until 2011, 
the normative-geopolitical ambiguity of the ENP 
– inherent to all imperial politics – leaned too far 
to the normative side of the equation, culminating 
in an overly technocratic process aiming at 
convergence, but resulting in a dangerous 
procedural fixation, where Agreements and 
Action Plans imitate genuine partnership behind 
a ‘normative fig leaf’ obscuring asymmetrical 
power relations. The impact of the EU on Lebanon 
increased substantially after 2011. This was caused 
mainly by two developments which mutually re-
enforced each other: The war in Syria with its 
dramatic geostrategic consequences for the Middle 
East and the introduction of the EU’s External 
Action Service allowing a local – and through 
extended competences substantial – influence on 
EU decision making. The radical bilateralization 
of the “more for more” principle, short-term 
programming in the SPRING programme, and 
the “three M-approach” in better addressing the 
actual needs of the Southern partners, reflects a 
more realistic approach in Euro-Mediterranean 
relations; a departure from the narrow corset of 
the EU Action Plan and normative programming 
in spirit of convergence. Since 2011, the focus 
shifted towards the geopolitical component of the 
ambiguous imperial politics of the EU in Lebanon. 
To avoid accusations of “regulatory imperialism” 
the EU should continue to strengthen the local 
capacities of the Delegations and roll back the 
bureaucratic apparatus of the Commission. This 
paper recommends the following for the ENP in 
general and EU politics in Lebanon specifically:
1) More Realism in the Neighbourhood: The EU 
in its entire Neighbourhood suffers from normative-
geopolitical ambiguity, demanding at the same 
time a geopolitically motivated stabilization of the 
peripheries (in terms of power) and a sustainable 
transformation of the neighbourhood according to 
the value system of the EU (in terms of norms). In 
the framework of the ENP, the EU should be more 
straightforward regarding the question of what its 
genuine interests are and focus foremost on short 
and mid-term stability objectives which are in the 
IE
P 
Po
lic
y 
Pa
pe
rs
 o
n 
Ea
st
er
n 
Eu
ro
pe
 a
nd
 C
en
tr
al
 A
si
a
18
best interest of the ENP partners as well. In the 
eyes of potential partners, a ‘neo-imperial’ attitude 
especially linked to a snobbish convergence 
agenda, and raising high expectations which are 
unachievable, are much more dangerous than 
a conventional foreign policy guided by norms 
and values, while pursuing in a transparent and 
self-confident fashion its interests step-by-step. 
Besides, a more realist approach would include 
an honest reflection on the limited resources 
of the Union. Concerning Lebanon, the second 
EU-Lebanon Action Plan, negotiated since 2011 
and currently awaiting the completion of legal 
procedures, should be reviewed and streamlined 
to avoid a technocratic and overambitious reform 
agenda.
2) Strengthening the role of the EEAS: The 
local perspective of the EU Delegations, with their 
extended competences between the Commission 
and the Council, is an indispensable asset in filling 
some of the core objectives of the ENP with life: 
ownership, tailor-made approaches to the needs of 
the partner countries, “more for more” principle. 
The importance of the foreign Delegations and 
their potentially positive impact on the Union’s 
external relations and decision making needs to 
be highlighted in discussions with those – usually 
larger – member states which observe the European 
diplomats with skepticism and fear the decreasing 
importance of their national external services. 
Furthermore, and to ensure proper planning and 
coordination the EEAS’ role between Commission 
and Council needs to be clarified. The Council 
should be strengthened to allow political steering 
and avoid a technocratization of EU politics. As 
representation of the member states, eventually 
the Council could assign particular missions to EU 
diplomats to the expense of individual member 
state delegations.
3) Money – making financial support more 
flexible: The long-term programming of EU 
funds is often restricting the Union’s ability to 
respond quickly to changes and challenges in 
the neighbourhood. An increase in its flexibility 
allows for speedier and more strategic support. A 
substantial percentage of the ENPI funds, exceeding 
the current SPRING funds, should be available 
on shorter notice enabling the EU Delegations to 
react swiftly to new political developments in their 
countries. Concerning Lebanon, the EU played a 
positive role so far, but could do more to pressure 
its member states into substantial commitments 
to help the Lebanese government with the Syrian 
refugee crisis, as promised by an International 
Support Group for Lebanon, established in New 
York in September 2013. So far, not much of the 
promised grants materialized on the ground in 
Lebanon and the EU should remind the member 
states of potential costs of an ‘exploding’ refugee 
situation in Lebanon.
4) Markets – re-focusing the principle of 
convergence: The EU needs to clarify the 
conditions of access to the Union’s internal market. 
To help Lebanon’s agricultural sector, Brussels 
allowed for the import of Lebanese potatoes in short 
time. The main obstacle for offering partial shares 
in the EU’s internal market and accomplishing free 
trade agreements are different trade regulations 
(e.g. sanitary standards). Harmonization of trade 
regulations should be focal point of future Action 
Plans over a vague democratization agenda. Clear 
benchmarks need to be introduced and substantial 
EU funds and projects should aim at improving 
sanitary conditions to meet European standards. 
Concerning Lebanon specifically, the economic 
grievances, further fuelled by the Syrian war, 
in the North (Tripoli and Akkar) and the Bekaa 
are most acute and call for short-term measures. 
Since poverty and hopelessness play a central role 
in causing Sunni frustration and radicalization, 
Brussels should focus development projects on 
these areas; weakening the appeal of destabilising 
non-state actors.79
5) Mobility – sincerely addressing visa 
facilitation: the EU needs to attract high-skilled 
young people from the MENA-region. More 
opportunities, in terms of student exchanges and 
vocational trainings, need to be offered. The 
neglect of existing initiatives (e.g. Blue Card) 
79  Cp. Julien Barnes-Dacey (2012) Lebanon: Containing Spillover 
from Syria, ECFR/61, September, 9.
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by the member states is intolerable and leads 
to a tremendous disadvantage for the EU in 
competition with the migration regimes of other 
states (e.g. USA, Canada), where policies are 
much more welcoming and easier. To this end, 
Brussels should consider to lower the hurdles for 
the Blue Card (especially the 1.5 average annual 
salary), introduce recruitment agencies based on an 
awareness campaign among European companies 
and provide more transparent information on the 
migration process. 
4) Beyond “three M” – security: To avoid all 
spillovers of the Syrian war into neighboring 
countries, the EU should maintain its close and 
steady relations with all major forces in Lebanon. 
This would include getting Hezbollah back to the 
negotiation table of the National Dialogue, which 
the party left in protest against the first cabinet 
statement of the Salam government in February 
2014. Furthermore, the Delegation needs to 
convince all Lebanese actors of the importance of 
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014. 
The fate of the presidential elections still remains 
cloudy. Without a legitimate successor to president 
Michel Sleiman, it will be extremely difficult to 
reach consensus on the complex issue of electoral 
reform and have parliamentary elections in 
November 2014.
Since 2011 the EU is moving towards a greater 
assertiveness and displays a new self-confidence 
in international politics. This paper argues for 
embracing the geopolitical component of the 
EU’s ambiguous imperial politics, to adopt a 
normatively less ambitious and conventionally 
more determined ENP. This includes the 
importance of values and norms as essential 
guideline for external behavior as genuine values 
– and not merely as a technocratic end in itself.
